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Deep dive · Segmentation toolbox

Untangling a legacy firewall rule base.

IT/OT segmentationZones & conduitsIEC 62443 · NIS2

A legacy firewall rule base tells you a lot about a network, just rarely what you hoped. Hundreds of entries, any-rules, management exceptions, DMZ shortcuts: each one a record of where the zone model eroded in practice. The temptation is to start deleting. In a hybrid IT/OT environment, that is how you cause the outage.

Why deleting rules is not enough

Firewall rule cleanup in an IT/OT environment is not a cosmetic exercise. Legacy permits, any-rules, management exceptions, DMZ shortcuts and unclear object groups are direct indicators of where segmentation has eroded, but just deleting them risks taking production down, because many of those rules quietly carry a real operational need.

The work is to trace each rule back to a zone, a legitimate flow and an operational owner. Two principles run through it:

Understand first, then reduce

Policy hits, object references and zone context decide what goes, not a guess about what looks unused.

Hybrid, not siloed

The IT, DMZ, admin and OT paths are reviewed together, in one picture, not split by team.

01Extract the configuration

The first step reads the existing setup: interfaces, zones, policies, objects and the obvious gaps. A configuration file is parsed automatically; the result is not a target design yet, but a reliable fact base that puts IT, OT and security on the same page.

A FortiGate configuration imported and parsed: interfaces, policies, objects and findings, read straight from the file

02Prioritise the findings

Not every legacy issue is equally critical. Any-rules, broad management permits, missing inspection and hard IT/OT exceptions are ranked by risk and feasibility, so the cleanup starts where it matters, not where it is easiest. The panel below is the parser output from the imported configuration: 33 findings across policy, hardening, VPN and architecture.

forti-anonymized.txt – parsed 41 interfaces · 0 zones · 69 policies · 72 objects
33 findings 9 High 14 Medium 5 Low 5 Info
High
Policy
An any → any allow spanning the IT/OT boundary
replace with explicit conduits
High
Architecture
No security zones defined: segmentation exists only as ad-hoc interface policy
derive a zone model
High
VPN
Remote-maintenance VPN terminates directly inside the OT network
land in the DMZ, broker access
High
Policy
Broad management permit from the office VLAN into the OT range
restrict to a jump host
Medium
Hardening
No inspection profile on the inter-zone policies
enable inspection on conduit rules
Medium
Policy
Object group "legacy-hosts" – 40 addresses across mixed zones
split by zone, scope to need
+ 27 more findings across policy, hardening, VPN and architecture
The parser output, ranked: 6 of 33 findings, each with a recommended cleanup action

03Derive the target communication

Cleanup without a target design just grows new exceptions. From the zone model and the communication matrix, a reduced target rule set emerges, and conduits document the permitted boundaries between IT, DMZ and OT, with everything else denied by default.

IT office · enterprise DMZ brokered boundary OT production conduit conduit direct IT → OT any-rule · removed
The principle: traffic crosses through the DMZ on explicit conduits; the direct any-rule is gone

That principle has to become something a team can actually review and sign off. The communication matrix turns it into an explicit grid: every pair of zones gets a deliberate Allow or Deny decision, with protocol-specific exceptions where a flow is genuinely needed. It is the document the new rule set is built from, and the reference an auditor can check it against.

Zone communication matrix – Allow and Deny decisions between IT and OT security zones across Purdue levels
The communication matrix: every zone-to-zone flow as a deliberate Allow or Deny, the authoritative reference for the target rule set

From analysis to implementation

The analysis delivers the fact base and the prioritisation. Four building blocks then carry the target design into a running rule set:

1

Align matrix and target zones

The analysis becomes an approvable target design: zones, conduits and documented target flows for IT, DMZ, admin and OT.

2

Plan pilot rules in waves

Instead of a risky big bang, high-impact rules are bundled into pilot packages, each with a maintenance window and a fallback path.

3

Decommission legacy rules

Legacy exceptions, broad objects and unresolved permits are not blindly deleted but cleanly migrated or deliberately removed.

4

Anchor review and ownership

Logging, responsibilities and recurring reviews keep the new rule set from eroding again the moment the project ends.

What good cleanup looks like

Beyond delete candidates

Management access, DMZ boundaries and OT services are reviewed too, not just the obviously dead rules.

Rules tied back to zones

Every rule is verified against a target design of zones and conduits, not left as a standalone permit.

Inventory stays visible

Legacy exceptions and hybrid paths are deliberately migrated or decommissioned, never quietly ignored.

Review-ready operations

Logging, ownership and regular reviews stop the rule base from growing uncontrolled all over again.

A clean rule base is not the one with fewer rules. It is the one where every rule traces back to a zone, a flow and an owner.

Frequently asked

Isn't it enough to just delete unused rules?
No. In IT and OT networks, rules often represent real operational needs, workarounds or missing zones. Without communication and zone context, a seemingly unnecessary entry can be business- or production-critical.
Does this only work with FortiGate?
The example shown uses a FortiGate configuration analysis. Methodically, the approach applies to other vendors as well: understand the rule base, derive the zones, document the communication requirements, and develop the target rule set from there.
How do you reduce the risk to ongoing operations?
Through prioritisation and waves: critical any-rules first, accompanied by logging, piloting, maintenance windows and sign-off from IT, OT and the service owners. Cleanup is not a one-off sprint but a managed transformation.
What is the difference between cleanup and redesign?
Cleanup reduces and organises the existing rule base. Redesign defines the target system. Brownfield projects usually need both: first understand and untangle the existing rules, then establish a target rule set with zones and conduits.
How does this relate to IEC 62443 and an OT DMZ?
IEC 62443 provides the principle (zones and conduits instead of uncontrolled lateral communication), and the DMZ is a central boundary. Firewall rule cleanup is the operational step that makes that architecture enforceable in a hybrid IT/OT environment.
Is this only about firewall rules, or also VLANs and switch ACLs?
Firewall rules control traffic between zones; VLANs and switch ACLs define which devices belong to a zone and what is permitted at Layer 2. They go together: the firewall analysis reveals which zones actually exist, and from there it becomes clear where VLANs are missing or poorly scoped and where switch ACLs need to follow.
What does firewall cleanup have to do with NIS2?
NIS2 requires documented network security measures and regular effectiveness assessments. A rule base with hundreds of undocumented legacy entries meets neither. A cleanup directly serves several measures in the catalogue (risk analysis, effectiveness assessment, and access control) by providing the auditable foundation: documented zones, justified rules and a review process an auditor can verify.
How do I keep the rule base clean long-term?
Through a defined rule lifecycle: every new rule needs a request path, a responsible owner, a documented justification and an expiry or review date. Regular audits check whether rules still match an active communication requirement. Without ownership and process, every rule base grows back to the same state within a few years.
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